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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004732

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NP/RA, T, NP/MNA, IO/T AND NEA/NGA

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TAGS: [DA](#) [IR](#) [KNNP](#) [MNUC](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#)

SUBJECT: TURKEY PROMISES FULL SUPPORT FOR THE USG'S
IAEA/IRAN STRATEGY, EXPRESSES DEEP CONCERN OVER IRAN'S
NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMS

1. (U) Classified by Charge d'Affaires ad interim Robert
Deutsch. Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

2. (C) SUMMARY. NP A/DAS Mark Fitzpatrick and T Senior
Advisor David Wurmser were in Ankara on July 24 to consult
with a team of Turkish MFA officials, led by Ambassador Turan
Morali (Director-General for International Security Affairs
and Disarmament), on the way forward in addressing Iran's
nuclear program through the IAEA. Morali and his team
stressed that Turkey shares USG concerns over the Iranian
program, and noted that the combination of Iran's nuclear
weapons ambitions and ballistic missile program is
particularly worrying. Morali expressed full support for
delivering a tough message to Iran on this issue, both
bilaterally and within the IAEA. Significantly, he also
promised to speak with the Egyptians, who have provided
top-cover to Iran within the IAEA. However, Morali also
admitted that Turkey will maintain its policy of
"constructive engagement" with Iran, due to the fact that it
is a direct neighbor. END SUMMARY.

THE USG STRATEGY AND CONCERNS

3. (C) The meeting began with Fitzpatrick and Wurmser giving
an overview of the USG strategy for halting the Iranian
nuclear weapons program through the IAEA. The USG expects
that IAEA Director-General El Baradei's report to the
September Board of Governors (BOG) meeting regarding
inspections in Iran will provide ample evidence of safeguards
violations. Therefore, the IAEA Board of Governors (BOG)
should issue a finding of Iranian non-compliance with IAEA
safeguards requirements to the UN Security Council in
September.

4. (C) Fitzpatrick went on to say that it is crucial that the
wording of the resolution and the votes in favor of it are
lined up before the BOG meeting. However, El Baradei has said
that he will issue the report on August 29 -- this allows
only a week for consideration of the report and international
consultation before the BOG meeting. The USG is pressing the
IAEA Secretariat to release the report by August 15,
Fitzpatrick said, and hopes that Turkey will also weigh in
with the IAEA on this issue. Fitzpatrick also requested that
Turkey use any influence that it has on countries like
Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, which have either tended to
act as apologists for Iran within the IAEA, or have tried to
expand the Iran issue to include Israel's nuclear program and
a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East.

TURKEY IS VERY CONCERNED OVER IRAN'S
NUCLEAR AND MISSILE PROGRAMS

5. (C) Morali said that Turkey is comforted that it is not
alone in its concerns regarding Iran's nuclear program. The
June BOG meeting demonstrated that many members of the
international community fully concur with Turkey's position
on the matter -- Iran's nuclear weapons program must be
halted and reversed, and it must prove to the international
community that its nuclear program is intended only for
civilian, peaceful purposes. An aggressive strategy on the
part of the IAEA and like-minded states is integral to this
effort. To that end, Morali promised that Turkey would
demarche the Egyptians in an effort to ensure their
cooperation at the September BOG meeting. Morali also
expressed concern that Iran would try to "clean up" some of
its nuclear sites in hopes of hiding incriminating evidence.

6. (C) Morali and Bulent Tulun (Deputy Director-General for

Disarmament) agreed with the point made by Fitzpatrick and Wurmser that Iran does not need enrichment and reprocessing capabilities for a civilian, peaceful nuclear program. Morali promised to raise this point with Iranian representatives.

17. (C) Tulun also pointed out that the combination of Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs is of particular concern. Fitzpatrick and Wurmser strongly concurred. Wurmser also noted that Iran's ballistic missile program is itself evidence of an intent to develop nuclear weapons, since it does not make strategic sense to develop long-range missiles only for the purpose of delivering conventional warheads.

TURKEY PRESENTS ITS CONCERNS TO IRAN

18. (C) Morali stressed that Turkey has made its concerns clear to Iran, and provided two specific examples of the occasions on which it has done so. He said that the Iranian ambassador had recently come to see him, complaining about a statement from Turkey in a recent CTBT PREPCOM (Morali told him that he must be referring to Turkey's statement before the June BOG meeting; it had made no such statement to the CTBT PREPCOM). Morali told him that Iran must stop stalling the IAEA and "open up." The Ambassador claimed that Iran is ready to give IAEA inspectors full access and that it is ready to sign the Additional Protocol, with one condition: that it reflect in writing that Iran will receive international assistance with its civilian nuclear program.

19. (C) Morali reflected that he believed this condition to be acceptable, since Iran already receives such assistance from the IAEA. However, he also pointed out that Turkey's official position is that Iran should sign the Additional Protocol without condition. Fitzpatrick noted that the USG would not support any condition to Iran's signing of the Additional Protocol.

110. (C) The Iranian ambassador also raised the "double standards" issue (i.e. the Israeli nuclear program). Morali told him that Iran should not push this argument, since if it starts pointing fingers at other nuclear powers, that implies it too wants to become a nuclear power. Turkey's policy is clear and consistent: it does not want any of its neighbors to have nuclear weapons.

111. (C) In addition, the Turkish Prime Minister raised this issue with the Iranian Deputy President during a meeting in May. The Prime Minister told the Deputy President openly, in front of many other participants, that Iran must convince the international community that it has nothing to hide.

THE DIFFICULTY IN ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM

112. (C) At the same time, Morali noted that there are a number of factors impeding the effort to convince Iran to roll back its nuclear weapons program (besides whatever strategic rationale has driven its development). The first is that many officials within the Iranian government probably do not know the extent of this program within their country. In addition, while the reformists don't want Iran to be isolated within the international community, they are also unlikely to push against the nuclear weapons program, for fear of recrimination from the conservatives.

...BUT WE CAN'T BURN OUR BRIDGES WITH IRAN

113. (C) Morali admitted that Turkey is handling this issue very delicately. The fact that Iran is a direct neighbor, and that the current Turkish government has some affinity for Iran, means that Turkey will maintain its policy of "constructive engagement" with Iran. Turkey's statement before the June BOG, for example, was "balanced," in that it did note some areas of Iranian cooperation. Nevertheless, Turkey fully concurs that a firm message must be given to Iran on this issue, even if Turkey presents its concerns quietly, out of the public eye.

114. (C) COMMENT: Turkey's response to our concerns on Iranian proliferation is clear. They will work closely with us

diplomatically for an international effort to reverse Iran's program. Nonetheless, given Iran's proximity to Turkey, they will surely limit public elements of this effort and seek to maintain their stance in the bounds of "good neighborliness."
END COMMENT.

15. (U) This cable has been cleared with A/DAS Fitzpatrick.
DEUTSCH